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We analyze an adverse selection environment with third party supervision. The supervisor is
partly informed of the agent￿ s type. The supervisor and the agent collude while interacting with
the principal. Contracting with the agent directly and ignoring the presence of the supervisor
constitutes the no-supervision benchmark. We show that delegating to the supervisor reduces
the principal￿ s payo⁄ compared to the no-supervision benchmark under a standard condition
on the distribution of the agent￿ s types. In contrast, if the principal contracts with both the
agent and the supervisor, there exists a mechanism that improves the principal￿ s payo⁄ over
the no-supervision payo⁄.
JEL Classi￿cation: D82; C72; L51
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The individual with the best information on the costs of an economic activity is often the ￿agent￿
who incurs these costs. One of the ￿ndings of the adverse selection literature is that a ￿principal￿
who wants to infer this information has to leave an information rent to the productive agent.
In many circumstances, however, the agent is not the unique source for information on the
production technology. The existence of an informed third party may improve the principal￿ s
payo⁄, by reducing the information rent he must sacri￿ce.1 At the same time, the introduction
of this ￿supervisor￿creates the potential for collusive behavior against the principal￿ s will. If the
supervisor is completely corrupted by the agent, then the supervisor - agent pair behaves like a
single player. In such a case, from the principal￿ s perspective, contracting with the supervisor -
agent coalition is no di⁄erent from contracting with the agent in the absence of the supervisor.
An example ￿tting this discussion is a benevolent government￿ s regulation of a ￿rm with
unknown cost. In this environment, the regulator can be thought of as the supervisor, whose
close interaction with the ￿rm provides her with better information on the cost. Another
consequence of this close interaction is the regulator￿ s vulnerability to capture by the ￿rm:
The regulator may end up as an advocate who protects the interests of the ￿rm, rather than
as an informant for the government. Other examples include the involvement of an auditor
who reports the conduct of management to stockholders and an employee who reports the
performance of a coworker to management.
A necessary condition for the principal to bene￿t from the supervisor￿ s existence is an
ine¢ ciency in the performance of the supervisor - agent coalition. In the examples above,
the need for supervision materializes as a response to an informational asymmetry between
the principal and the agent. As such, it is natural to think that the supervisor may also be
less informed than the agent. Once we introduce this possibility, supervision may matter.
1We use masculine pronouns for the principal and the agent, and feminine pronouns for the supervisor.
1The contribution of this paper is the demonstration of how the principal can manipulate the
interaction between these asymmetrically informed parties to support a coalitional ine¢ ciency
that serves his own interests.2
The most general organizational design for the principal is contracting with both the su-
pervisor and the agent through a grand contract. A special case of this design would be the
principal contracting with the supervisor and delegating to her the authority to contract with
the agent. Delegation restricts the principal￿ s ability to create direct incentives for the agent.
Nevertheless, he can in￿ uence the supervisor￿ s interaction with the agent to create indirect
incentives. One commonly observed theme in the literature on multi-agent contracts is an
organizational equivalence principle: From the principal￿ s perspective, delegation performs as
well as any other grand contract.3 However, in our setup, this indirect in￿ uence scheme does
not always ful￿ll the task. We show that delegating to the supervisor is dominated not only by
the optimal grand contract, but also by not having access to the supervisor at all, as long as a
condition on the distribution of the cost levels is satis￿ed. This condition corresponds to the
condition which would ensure that the ￿monotonicity of the output levels￿constraint is slack
in the absence of supervision.
When delegation fails, it is still possible for the principal to bene￿t from the supervisory
information. However, it is vital to keep the principal￿ s communication with the agent open
for bene￿cial supervision. Through this communication channel, the principal can provide the
agent with an outside option to colluding with the supervisor. The agent can ￿blow the whistle￿
2There is one strand of the earlier literature on collusion that sustains such a coalitional ine¢ ciency by
adopting exogenous transactional imperfections between the colluding parties. In this paper we do not make any
such assumption regarding the transaction technology. In what follows, the only potential source for a collusion
failure is the asymmetric information between the colluding parties. See Tirole [33] for a review of this transaction
cost strand of the literature.
3See Melumad, Mookherjee, and Reichelstein [25] among others.
2on the supervisor and contract directly with the principal.
Our model allows for three possible production cost levels for the agent. The supervisor can
tell when the highest cost level is realized. However, she cannot distinguish the other two cost
levels.4 Modeling supervisory information as a non-trivial partition of the cost levels generates
an environment where the supervisor is partly informed about the agent￿ s cost. Obviously this
is not the only way to model a partly informed supervisor. If the source for the supervisor￿ s in-
formation is thought to be a signal correlated with the agent￿ s cost, then our model corresponds
to a particular - measure zero - speci￿cation, where the signals have disjoint supports on the
cost space. One by-product of this information structure is the nested form of the information
of di⁄erent players. The supervisor knows less than the agent.5 Therefore, collusion between
these two players can be studied as a one sided asymmetric information problem, avoiding the
informed principal considerations.6 Another advantage of our information structure is a re-
duction in the number of incentive constraints that need to be accounted for when solving the
collusion problem. This second point is particularly helpful in identifying the optimal collusion
proof information rent levels.
It should be noted that the objective of the paper is not to provide a blanket statement that
delegation is dominated regardless of the circumstances. Even in the context of our stylized
model, when the monotonicity constraint is binding in the absence of supervision, delegation
is an improvement over not having access to the supervisor. In this case, delegation may even
4The highest cost level may be the result of adopting an earlier generation of production technologies and the
supervisor may be capable of identifying the relevant generation. The author thanks Jean Tirole for suggesting
this interpretation of the connected partition structure.
5Another way of achieving a nested information structure is assuming that the agent has perfect information
on the supervisor￿ s signal. A paper by Faure-Grimaud, La⁄ont, and Martimort [9], which is discussed in the
subsequent paragraphs, follows this latter approach.
6Quesada [30] studies collusion initiated by an informed party under one sided informational asymmetry.
3be the principal￿ s optimal response to collusion. Instead, our aim here is to demonstrate that
delegation is not always the remedy to collusion. This is due to the fact that some forms
of coalitional ine¢ ciencies (speci￿cally ine¢ ciencies requiring an overproduction with respect
to what is optimal for the coalition) are not possible to sustain under delegation. Moreover,
when delegation fails, this does not imply there is no hope of making use of the supervisory
information. We show that a centralized contract, where the principal directly communicates
with the agent as well as with the supervisor, does indeed sustain the necessary coalitional
ine¢ ciencies that improve the principal￿ s rent extraction over no-supervision.
In what follows, we model collusion as a ￿side contract￿between the colluding parties. This
methodology is due to two papers by La⁄ont and Martimort [18,20], where they identify the
optimal outcome that is available for a principal contracting with two agents colluding under
asymmetric information.7 More recently, Che and Kim [6] consider a collusion setup, which is
quite general in terms of the number of colluders, the distribution of types, and the production
technology. They also allow for collusion to take place between a strict subset of the agents
rather than being pervasive. They show that the second best payo⁄is attainable and, therefore,
collusion does not in￿ ict any harm on the principal.8 However, due to the restrictions they
impose on the correlation of information of the colluding parties, their result does not apply to
the environment studied here.
A substantial portion of the research on collusion suggests that delegation is the optimal
7Another paper that formalizes collusion as a side contract is written by Caillaud and Jehiel [3] in the context
of auctions with externalities. For models predating this approach see Kofman and Lawarree [16,17], and Felli
[11]. La⁄ont and Martimort [18,20] study collusion between agents producing perfect complements. See Severinov
[31] for collusion between agents producing substitutable goods.
8In related papers, Pavlov [29] and Che and Kim [7] establish conditions for the implementability of the second
best payo⁄ for an independent private values auction environment where bidders collude prior to participating
in the auction.
4organizational response to collusion. Baliga and Sjostrom [2], and La⁄ont and Martimort [19]
establish the optimality of delegation in models of collusion between two productive agents in
the contexts of moral hazard and adverse selection, respectively.9 In contrast, Mookherjee and
Tsumagari [27] demonstrate suboptimality of delegation when agents collude prior to making
their decisions to participate in the mechanism. Mookherjee [26] provides a survey of this
literature on delegation.
Another paper by Faure-Grimaud, La⁄ont, and Martimort [9] studies delegation in an in-
formed supervisor - productive agent setup. In their setup, delegation is the optimal strategy
for the principal under the possibility of supervisor - agent collusion.10 This paper employs a
connected partition structure to model the supervisor￿ s information as opposed to the signals
with full support that Faure-Grimaud, La⁄ont, and Martimort [9] utilize. These alternative
information structures create two di⁄erent environments. Bene￿tting from the supervisor￿ s ex-
istence requires di⁄erent types of coalitional ine¢ ciencies in these di⁄erent environments. In
Section 5 of our paper, we discuss how delegation successfully creates one form of ine¢ ciency
but fails to sustain the other form.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the general model
and outline the outcomes that are implementable i) under delegation to the supervisor and ii)
under grand contracts, where the principal communicates with both players to eliminate the
scope for collusion. In Section 3, we show why delegation fails as a response to the threat of
collusion under a standard condition on the distribution of costs. In Section 4, we identify
the optimal collusion proof outcome that achieves bene￿cial supervision when delegation fails
9To be precise, Baliga and Sjostrom [2] show that delegation is optimal for a wide range of parameters, but
not all. La⁄ont and Martimort [19] show that delegation completely negates the adverse e⁄ects of collusion.
10Unlike us, Faure-Grimaud, La⁄ont, and Martimort [9] allow for risk aversion of the supervisor. Their optimal
delegation mechanism attains the second best outcome when the supervisor is risk neutral. However, under risk
aversion, collusion is harmful.
5to do so. In Section 5, we show that the su¢ cient condition for the failure of delegation is
also a necessary condition. When this condition is violated, delegation is an improvement over
no-supervision. We conclude in Section 6. We relegate the proofs to the Appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 The No-Supervision Benchmark
The agent (A) is the player who bears the costs of production. His utility function is t ￿ ￿x,
where t is the transfer he receives from the principal, ￿ is the unit cost of production, and x is the




, where 0 < ￿ < e ￿ < ￿.
The probability that the production cost is ￿ is denoted by f (￿). The distribution of the cost
is common knowledge among the players. The agent also knows the realization of ￿. Therefore,
we refer to the variable ￿ as the type of A.
The principal (P) is the residual claimant of the output. For an output level x and a transfer
level t, his payo⁄is W (x)￿t. The function W (￿) is twice continuously di⁄erentiable and satis￿es
the following standard conditions: W0 (x) > 0;W00 (x) < 0 for all x; and limx!0 W0 (x) = 1;
limx!1 W0 (x) = 0: To induce A to participate in the productive activity, rather than not
participating and receiving zero utility, P can commit to a contract. A contract is a collection
of an arbitrary message space M, and two functions de￿ned on M that specify:
i) the non-negative output level, x : M ! R+,
ii) the level of transfer to A, t : M ! R.
Let x￿ be the output level when the realized type of the agent is ￿. It follows from the
standard treatment of this problem that an output pro￿le fx￿g￿2￿ is implementable through
a contract if and only if it is weakly decreasing, i.e. x￿ ￿ xe ￿ ￿ x￿. Moreover, the agent￿ s
lowest utility levels that are compatible with this implementation are revealed by the binding
IR constraint of the highest cost type ￿ and the binding upward adjacent IC constraints for
6the other types:
V o
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These utility levels reveal the information rent P is supposed to leave for A to induce A￿ s
truthful revelation of his type through his response to the contract. Accordingly, the optimal
implementable set of output levels for P are determined by
fxns











s.t. x￿ ￿ xe ￿ ￿ x￿,
where the superscript ns stands for no-supervision.
The assumption limx!0 W0 (x) = 1 implies that there is always some level of production,
i.e. xns
￿ > 0 for all ￿. Since the optimal information rent levels, identi￿ed by functions V o
￿ (￿),
are increasing in the output levels of all types other than type ￿, the optimal output levels for
these types are distorted downward from their respective ￿￿rst best￿levels: The solution to
the no-supervision problem induces ￿underproduction￿with respect to the total welfare max-
imizing output levels. This underproduction phenomenon is a common feature of mechanism
design problems provided that the productive agent￿ s outside option yields the same utility level
regardless of his type. Later in the paper, we will see that a type dependent reservation utility
for the agent can reverse the direction of the ine¢ ciency. This reversal is the key to bene￿cial
supervision.
As is typical in similar design problems, requiring monotonicity of the output levels does
not impose a restriction on the output level of the most e¢ cient type in problem (2). Therefore
constraint x￿ ￿ xe ￿ can be ignored. We refer to the remaining constraint xe ￿ ￿ x￿ as the no-
supervision monotonicity constraint. When we ignore the monotonicity constraint and derive
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: (3)
When discussing delegation as an organizational form, we will see that its performance depends
on whether this condition is satis￿ed.
2.2 Supervision
In this section, we introduce the supervisor (S) as an additional player in the principal - agent
interaction. S does not have any direct interest in production. She is risk neutral and her
payo⁄ is determined only by the monetary payments she receives. The value of S to the design
problem is in the information she possesses. S is able to tell whether A is the least e¢ cient type,
￿, or not. However, she is not able to distinguish types e ￿ and ￿. Accordingly, S￿ s information








of A￿ s type space ￿. Notice that
S observes a ￿ner partition than does P, but a coarser partition than does A.
We de￿ne a grand contract as a collection of two arbitrary message spaces, MS and MA;
as well as three functions de￿ned on the product of these spaces. MS and MA consist of the
messages that S and A can send to the principal respectively. The three functions specify:
i) the output level, x : MS ￿ MA ! R+,
ii) the transfer to A, t : MS ￿ MA ! R,
iii) the wage of S, w : MS ￿ MA ! R.
We now consider the output and payo⁄ levels that are generated through a grand contract.
As in the no-supervision benchmark, x￿ is de￿ned as the output level of an agent with cost ￿.
Now we reserve the letter V to denote the coalitional information rent. That is, V￿ is the sum
of the utility levels of A and S, whenever the agent￿ s type is ￿. Finally, U￿ is the utility level
of the agent. We refer to fx￿;V￿;U￿g￿2￿ as an outcome. Notice that an outcome identi￿es
the output level for every state of nature and the allocation of the rent created through the
production of this output.
8If any of the players rejects the grand contract, the game ends with zero production and no
monetary transfer to the players. In other words, the opportunity cost of accepting the grand
contract is 0 for both S and A. In order to ensure the acceptance of the grand contract by all
agent types, P must leave them with a non-negative utility level:
U￿ ￿ 0 for all ￿ 2 ￿. (4)
When A￿ s type is ￿, S￿ s ex-post surplus is V￿ ￿U￿. For S to participate in the mechanism that
implements the outcome fx￿;V￿;U￿g￿2￿, her interim expected surplus must be non-negative
regardless of the partition cell she observes:












Under the interim participation constraints,11 S can make a negative surplus in certain states
of nature. Nevertheless she is willing to participate in the grand contract at the interim stage,
since she cannot distinguish those states from those with positive surplus.12
Collusion Free Supervision
If there were no possibility of collusion in our environment, that is if S were not capable
of o⁄ering a side contract to A, then her participation constraints depicted by (5) and (6)
would be the only constraints governing S￿ s behavior. By setting V￿ = U￿ for all ￿, P ensures
S￿ s participation in the mechanism. Since S￿ s surplus is zero regardless of her report to P,
S has no incentive to misreport the partition cell she observes. In other words, P is able to
capture S￿ s information for free. Since S￿ s report reveals the information set she observes, A















12After establishing the relevance of supervision under collusion, we show that bene￿cial supervision can be
sustained even under the stronger ex-post participation constraints for the supervisor.
9can misreport his type only as some other type within the same information set. Accordingly,
P can implement an output pro￿le fx￿g￿2￿ with the utility levels
V￿ = U￿ = 0,
Ve ￿ = Ue ￿ = 0, (7)
V￿ = U￿ =
￿
e ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
xe ￿,
as long as x￿ ￿ xe ￿.
As before, the information rent to be paid to type ￿ is zero. However, the existence of
the supervisor gives P the opportunity to reduce the rent levels for the other types. To see
this, note that it is not possible for type e ￿ to misreport his type as ￿ when the supervisor
truthfully reveals her information. Therefore, P is able to leave zero rent to both types e ￿ and
￿. However, since type ￿ still has the option of imitating type e ￿, he must be compensated
with a positive information rent. Also notice that the monotonicity constraints are weaker with
the introduction of the supervisor. For implementability under collusion free supervision, the
output pro￿le must be monotonic within each cell of S￿ s information partition. That is, the
outcome should respect the constraint x￿ ￿ xe ￿. However, there is no monotonicity requirement
regarding output levels in separate partition cells.
With the possibility of collusion, the designer of the mechanism must account not only for
the individual misreportings by the parties taking part in the contract but also for the collective
manipulations of these individuals. In this case, the collusion free outcome constructed above
is not implementable. This outcome leaves both A and S with zero rent when A￿ s type is e ￿.
However, A would have acquired a strictly positive rent by misreporting his type as ￿. Such
a misreport would require S￿ s cooperation. Anticipating this potential for collusion, S can
increase her expected surplus by o⁄ering a side contract asking for a bribe from A for playing
along with the misreport.
Collusion and Supervision
10To formalize the process of collusion, we assume that S o⁄ers a side contract to A after the
acceptance of the grand contract by both parties. A side contract is a collection of a message
space for A, M0
A, and two functions de￿ned on M0
A, which specify:13
i) the messages that will be sent to P, m : M0
A ! MS ￿ MA,
ii) the bribe that A will pay to S, b : M0
A ! R.
If A accepts the side contract, his message to the side contract, which is an element of M0
A,
determines how S and A will respond to the grand contract.14 If the side contract is rejected,
both players are free to send any message they like.15
Each player is concerned with the total monetary transfer she or he receives or pays, but
not with the source or destination of these transfers. As such, S￿ s surplus is expressed as the
sum of the wage and the bribe, w + b. Now that P and A are making monetary payments
to this additional player, their utility functions must be amended to capture the e⁄ect of such
transfers. Accordingly, we rewrite the utility functions of these players as W (x) ￿ t ￿ w, and
t ￿ b ￿ ￿x respectively.
Following Faure-Grimaud, La⁄ont, and Martimort [9], we study two organizational re-
sponses to collusion potential. The ￿rst organizational form we discuss is delegation. Under
delegation, there is no direct communication or monetary transfer between P and A. Instead,
P contracts with S only and delegates her the authority to contract with A through a side
13Alternatively, we could have de￿ned the side contract to include a message space for S as well. Since S￿ s
type is known by A, this would not make a substantial di⁄erence in the analysis.
14In this paper, we ignore the issue of the enforcement of the contracts and assume that the side contract is
binding as well as the grand contract. For treatments that relax the enforceability assumption see Martimort
[23], Abdulkadiroglu and Chung [1], and Khalil and Lawarree [14].
15As is common in the earlier literature, we assume that S and A send their messages non-cooperatively
whenever the side contract is rejected. For an example of an alternative treatment, where the proposer of the
side contract commits to a certain message whenever the side contract is rejected, see Quesada [30].
11contract. If S and A fail to agree on a contract, there is no production. In other words, P
forgoes all direct interaction with A other than providing him with an exit option when A is
not satis￿ed with S￿ s o⁄er.16
The second organizational response to collusion is collusion proof implementation. In this
case, P contracts with both S and A directly through a grand contract. He designs the grand
contract so that there is no scope for collusion between S and A. Therefore, S ￿nds it optimal
to o⁄er a side contract that mimics the non-cooperative equilibrium of the game induced by
the grand contract.
The main di⁄erence between these two organizational forms is the outside option they
provide to A in the case where he rejects the side contract. Under delegation, A receives zero
utility if collusion fails. However, when a collusion proof grand contract is in e⁄ect, it may
ensure that A has a non-trivial outside option, providing him with a positive reservation utility.
Moreover, the level of the reservation utility for A can change with his type. This last point
will be crucial in establishing the relevance of collusion proof supervision.
Implementation
Under either organizational form, once a grand contract is accepted, the supervisor￿ s side
contract selection problem is quite similar to the principal￿ s problem in the no-supervision
benchmark. The outcomes available to S are determined by A￿ s incentives. Among these
available outcomes, S chooses the one that maximizes her expected surplus. Therefore, for an
outcome to be implementable for P, it has to constitute a solution to the surplus maximization
problem of S.
Suppose P wants to implement the outcome fx￿;V￿;U￿g￿2￿. If A￿ s type is ￿, this outcome
would provide S with the ex-post surplus of V￿ ￿ U￿. However, S can design a side contract
16Formally, delegation means o⁄ering a grand contract such that MA = f￿work￿ ;￿exit￿ g and t(ms;ma) = 0
for all ms and ma. Moreover x(ms;￿exit￿ ) = 0 and w(ms;￿exit￿ ) is su¢ ciently small for all ms. See Kim,
Lawarree, and Shin [15] for a model where provision of the exit option is a choice variable for the principal.
12that leads to the misreporting of A￿ s type. We denote this misreport by ^ c(￿), where ^ c :
￿ ! ￿. Under this misreport, the coalitional information rent is V^ c(￿) + (^ c(￿) ￿ ￿)x^ c(￿). The
side contract also determines each colluding player￿ s share of the information rent through
the speci￿cation of the bribe. Let ^ u(￿) be A￿ s share of the rent, where ^ u : ￿ ! R. We
refer to f^ c(￿); ^ u(￿)g￿2￿ as a manipulation of the outcome fx￿;V￿;U￿g￿2￿. Under a generic
manipulation, S￿ s ex-post surplus is V^ c(￿) +(^ c(￿) ￿ ￿)x^ c(￿) ￿ ^ u(￿). In order for fx￿;V￿;U￿g￿2￿
to be an implementable outcome, the expected value of V￿ ￿U￿ must be weakly larger than the
expected value of V^ c(￿) + (^ c(￿) ￿ ￿)x^ c(￿) ￿ ^ u(￿) under any manipulation available to S at the
side contracting stage. Since S observes the relevant partition cell at the time that she o⁄ers
the side contract, the expectation must be taken separately for each partition cell.
The remaining task is identifying the manipulations that are available to S at the side
contracting stage. The ￿rst restriction on availability results from the fact that S cannot
distinguish the di⁄erent types within the same partition cell. This does not imply any restriction
when A￿ s type is ￿. However, when S observes that A￿ s type is either e ￿ or ￿, she must provide
A the incentive not to imitate the other type in the same partition cell. Accordingly, for
f^ c(￿); ^ u(￿)g￿2￿ to be an available manipulation for S, the ￿agent￿ s collusion stage incentive

















The second restriction on the available manipulations is a consequence of the outside option
of collusion for A. The outside option depends on the form of organizational structure P would
follow. We start with the restriction under delegation. The outside option under this orga-
nizational form is the shut down of production, which provides A with zero reservation utility
regardless of his realized type. In addition to the AIC constraints, for f^ c(￿); ^ u(￿)g￿2￿ to be an
available manipulation for S, the ￿agent￿ s individual rationality constraints under delegation￿
13must be satis￿ed:
d ￿ AIR(￿) : ^ u(￿) ￿ 0 for all ￿ 2 ￿:


























f￿;U￿g￿2fe ￿;￿g 2 arg max





















We refer to conditions (8) and (9) as the delegation feasibility conditions.17 Our termi-
nology here follows that of Holmstrom and Myerson [12] who de￿ne the property of ￿incentive
feasibility,￿to refer to the set of outcomes such that no type of agent is willing to misreport his
type. Similarly, delegation feasibility requires that S is unwilling to o⁄er a side contract that
misreports A￿ s type.
Together with the participation constraints, delegation feasibility conditions describe the
set of implementable outcomes under delegation.
De￿nition 1 fx￿;V￿;U￿g￿2￿ is a delegation proof outcome if it satis￿es the participation
constraints (4), (5), (6), and the delegation feasibility conditions (8), (9).
As an alternative to delegation, P can follow a collusion proof design and provide A with U￿
as the outside option to collusion. In this case, any manipulation that is available to S through
an acceptable side contract should leave an agent of type ￿ with at least the utility level U￿.
17Following the notation introduced in the previous footnote, a direct delegation grand contract includes
message sets MA = f￿work￿ ;￿exit￿ g and MS = ￿. A direct contract such that x(￿;￿work￿ ) = x￿ and
w(￿;￿work￿ ) = V￿ + ￿x￿ is su¢ cient to induce a delegation feasible outcome.
14These constraints on manipulations are represented by the ￿agent￿ s collusion stage individual
rationality constraints:￿
AIR(￿) : ^ u(￿) ￿ U￿ for all ￿ 2 ￿:
Finally, we present the ￿collusion feasibility conditions￿ which guarantee that S is
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Notice that collusion feasibility is a weaker concept than delegation feasibility, since solutions
to (8) and (9) are also solutions to (10) and (11), respectively. This is not surprising since
delegation implies a loss of control for the principal compared to the centralized collusion proof
design.
To characterize the set of implementable outcomes under collusion proof implementation,
we merge the participation constraints with the feasibility conditions above.
De￿nition 2 fx￿;V￿;U￿g￿2￿ is a collusion proof outcome if it satis￿es the participation
constraints (4), (5), (6), and the collusion feasibility conditions (10), (11).
Since we have de￿ned V￿ as the sum of the information rents for S and A, the expected
payo⁄ for P is given as
X
￿2￿
f (￿)[W (x￿) ￿ ￿x￿ ￿ V￿]: (12)
This is the same objective function for P as in the no-supervision problem (2), provided that
the functions labeled V o
￿ (￿) are replaced with the corresponding V￿￿ s. P￿ s task is ￿nding an
15implementable (delegation proof or collusion proof depending on the organizational form as-
sumed) outcome that maximizes this expected payo⁄. Note that P does not have any intrinsic
preference on the distribution of the information rent V￿ between S and A, i.e., fU￿g￿2￿ does
not enter into his objective function. Nevertheless the distribution of the rent (the values for
fU￿g￿2￿) is relevant to P to ensure the implementability of an outcome.
In the sections that follow, we analyze the strengths and the weaknesses of delegation and
collusion proof implementation from the principal￿ s perspective.
3 Failure of Delegation
The performance of delegation as an organizational form is of interest to us for two reasons.
First, there may be economic environments where the principal is forced to follow the delegation
path due to a variety of exogenous factors including communication and information processing
costs. We would like to know if this constraint in￿ icts any cost on the principal. Moreover,
the analysis of how delegation performs in our setup will be helpful in contrasting the result
we derive in the following section with similar results that suggest that supervision is bene￿cial
even under the possibility of collusion.
Faure-Grimaud and Martimort [10] study delegation in a setup with an identical type and
information structure as here. Unlike this paper, they allow for the risk aversion of the supervi-
sor but assume that the highest cost agent is ine¢ cient to the extent that it is never optimal for
him to produce, i.e. x￿ is set to zero. The ￿rst part of our discussion will build on an extension
of their analysis for positive values of x￿.
As we mentioned earlier, the de￿ning feature of delegation is the shut down of production
whenever S and A do not agree on a side contract. This implies that the outside option of a side
contract for A is zero utility, as is the outside option of a no-supervision contract. Therefore,
the delegation proof utility pro￿le for A should mimic the construction of the function V o
￿ (￿)
16for both information sets of S. That is, the utility of A is determined by the binding d ￿ AIR




constraint for cost level ￿,
i.e. U￿ = Ue ￿ = 0 and U￿ =
￿
e ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
xe ￿. A delegation proof outcome should also leave the
appropriate rent to S so that she does not ￿nd it pro￿table to o⁄er a side contract misreporting
A￿ s type to P.
Proposition 1 Suppose the outcome fx￿;V￿;U￿g￿2￿ is delegation proof and the output pro￿le
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xe ￿ ￿ x￿
￿
.
The inequalities in (13) establish lower bounds for delegation proof coalitional rent levels
implementing a monotonic output pro￿le. Notice that the lower bounds for Ve ￿ and V￿ are larger
than the no-supervision information rents V o
e ￿ (￿) and V o
￿ (￿) calculated for the same pro￿le of
output levels. To understand these larger rents, suppose P tries to implement an outcome
leaving V o
e ￿ (￿) to the coalition whenever the agent￿ s type is e ￿. In this case, S would o⁄er a
side contract instructing this type of agent to misreport his type as ￿. Assuming V￿ is set
optimally at 0, the misreporting of the type e ￿ agent is not bene￿cial for S in this state of
nature. The bene￿t of the misreport is accrued whenever the agent￿ s type is ￿. Now that type
e ￿ is producing the lower output level x￿ instead of xe ￿, S can reduce the information rent she
is supposed to leave to the more e¢ cient type ￿ from
￿











e ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿
xe ￿ ￿ x￿
￿
on the lower bounds of Ve ￿ and V￿ captures this rent which is left to
S for not misreporting type e ￿ in order to reduce the information rent of type ￿. Faure-Grimaud
and Martimort [10] label this additional rent to the supervisor as the principal￿ s agency cost of
17intermediation.18
The increasing coalitional rent under delegation is also reminiscent of the ￿double mar-
ginalization￿of the information rents when there is an uninformed third party intermediating
between the principal and the agent. Since the third party is not informed, she must leave an
information rent to A. When this information rent is taken into account, the third party be-
haves as though she is a productive agent, whose production cost is equal to the ￿virtual￿cost
rather than the original cost A incurs. To substantiate this discussion, we consider a variant of
our model, where S observes the same information as P. When P delegates to this uninformed
supervisor, the coalitional information rent levels still respect the inequality
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xe ￿ ￿ x￿
￿
(14)
as before. However, since the supervisor￿ s participation decision is made in the interim stage,




e ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿
xe ￿ ￿ x￿
￿
,
can be taxed away by setting V￿ to be negative. This observation is also an implication of a
result by Melumad, Mookherjee, and Reichelstein [25], which is derived in a setup, where multi-
ple agents contribute to production and hold private information. Their result shows that when
the agents￿types are independently distributed, the agents are risk neutral, and their participa-
tion decisions are made in the interim stage, then the principal can obtain the ￿collusion free￿
second best payo⁄ by delegating to one of these agents.19
When types are correlated, as is the case when the supervisor￿ s partial information is nested
in the agent￿ s private information, the result by Melumad, Mookherjee, and Reichelstein [25]
18Unlike in the study of Faure-Grimaud and Martimort [10], the lower bounds stated in (13) are not necessarily
attainable for all parameterizations. In fact, there is no coalitional information rent pro￿le to implement strictly
monotonic output levels if the parameters satisfy f (￿)
￿









19Another condition for achieving the second best payo⁄ is the observability of the agent speci￿c production
contributions. This requirement is trivially satis￿ed in the current setup since there is only one productive agent.
18is no longer valid for examining the performance of delegation. If the supervisor￿ s informa-








, her participation constraints stipulate that V￿ is non-




, she must be
compensated not to misreport. Accordingly, the coalitional rent must be positive even when




. This brings our model closer to a
model constructed by McAfee and McMillan [24] to study delegation of an uninformed and lim-
itedly liable supervisor (the middle principal in their terminology). McAfee and McMillan [24]
demonstrate that the double rent for this supervisor cannot be taxed away due to the limited
liability constraints. In the current model, there is no exogenous limited liability constraint for
the supervisor. Nevertheless, the supervisor can still secure a non-negative surplus for herself
by misreporting an agent as type ￿.20
It is immediate from the proposition above that delegating to the supervisor performs
(strictly) worse than the no-supervision case in implementing (strictly) monotonic output levels.
However, as we have discussed earlier, it is also possible to implement non-monotonic output
levels when a supervisor is present. In order to give a full comparison of these two setups, we
have to examine the implementation of non-monotonic output levels as well. We relegate this
analysis to the Appendix and report our ￿ndings in the proposition that follows.
Proposition 2 (Failure of Delegation) Suppose the monotonicity constraint is slack for the
no-supervision problem, i.e. (3) holds and therefore xns
￿ < xns
e ￿ . Then P￿ s expected payo⁄ from
any delegation proof outcome is strictly lower than his optimal no-supervision expected payo⁄.
20Similarly, Mookherjee and Tsumagari [27] demonstrate that delegation to one of the two productive agents
(with independent types) is costly when these agents make their participation decisions after colluding and
learning each other￿ s type. The agents can refuse to participate if the mechanism leaves them with negative rent.
The timing in our paper does not permit the players to collude on their participation decisions. However, the
colluding parties can guarantee non-negative coalitional rents by collectively reporting the production cost as the
highest possible.
19Before ending our discussion of this section, we should note the signi￿cance of the slackness
of the no-supervision monotonicity constraint in the derivation of Proposition 2. We observe
in Section 5 that delegation is indeed an improvement over no-supervision if this monotonicity
constraint is relevant. Nevertheless, the current result presents a class of parameterizations,
identi￿ed by condition (3), where delegation to a partly informed supervisor is dominated by
no-supervision from the principal￿ s viewpoint. In the following section, we show that there is a
collusion proof outcome that dominates no-supervision for all parameterizations.
4 Collusion Proof Supervision
4.1 Relevance of Collusion Proof Supervision
So far we have proved that delegating to S is not the right organizational form for the principal,
if a standard assumption ensuring that the monotonicity constraint does not matter for the
no-supervision problem. As we have mentioned before, delegation is only a special case of
implementation with supervision. In order to say more regarding the value of supervision, we
need to consider collusion proof implementation, which yields a larger set of implementable
outcomes. In this section we pursue this task.
The advantage of collusion proof supervision stems from P￿ s ability to provide A with pos-
itive reservation utility when side contracting with S. To see the e⁄ect of a positive reservation
utility, consider the lower bounds on the delegation proof coalitional information rent levels de-
picted in (13). By increasing the reservation utility for the most e¢ cient type ￿, P can decrease
these lower bounds. This reservation utility is denoted as u￿. For values of u￿ smaller than
￿
e ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
x￿, there is no change in the lower bounds as in (13). By o⁄ering a side contract which
misreports type e ￿ as type ￿, S can reduce the information rent she is supposed to leave the most
e¢ cient type ￿ from
￿




e ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
x￿. As explained in the previous section, to prevent
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20over the no-supervision information rent. However, when u￿ is set between
￿




e ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
xe ￿, misreporting type e ￿ as type ￿ cannot reduce the information rent of type ￿ lower




e ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
xe ￿ ￿ u￿
i
is suf-
￿cient to preclude this misreport. Finally, when u￿ is
￿
e ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
xe ￿, misreporting type e ￿ as type ￿
does not change type ￿￿ s information rent. In this case, the lower bounds on the coalitional rent
levels Ve ￿ and V￿ are equal to the no-supervision information rents V o
e ￿ (￿) and V o
￿ (￿) calculated
for the same pro￿le of output levels.
Another way of demonstrating that P can implement the no-supervision information rent
levels in a collusion proof way is described here. For any output and information rent pro￿le
fx￿;V￿g￿2￿ implementable under no-supervision, we can ￿nd a collusion proof outcome that
replicates this same pair by setting U￿ = V￿ for all ￿. Such an implementation can be regarded
as ignoring the existence of S and contracting only with A. However, the more appealing ques-
tion here is whether the principal can bene￿t from the potentially weaker constraints associated
with supervision. In other words, we would like to know whether supervision makes it possible
to induce an output and information rent pro￿le fx￿;V￿g￿2￿ that is not no-supervision imple-
mentable and that provides a payo⁄ to P that is higher than his no-supervision optimal payo⁄.
The answer to this question determines the ￿relevance￿of supervision in collusive environments.
For supervision to be relevant, P must be able to ensure that the S - A coalition fails to
behave like a single composite player who maximizes the coalitional gains by means of a side
contract. More precisely, a necessary condition for relevance is the existence of a collusion proof
outcome that violates some of the binding constraints of the no-supervision problem. Recall that
when the monotonicity constraint is slack, the only binding constraints of the no-supervision
problem are the IR constraint of type ￿ and the upward adjacent IC constraints of types e ￿
and ￿. The following proposition shows that the no-supervision IC constraint regarding type ￿
is indeed violated by the optimal collusion proof coalitional information rents implementing a
monotonic output pro￿le.
21Proposition 3 (Relevance)Any monotonic output pro￿le x￿ ￿ xe ￿ ￿ x￿ is collusion proof.
The lowest coalitional information rent levels and the corresponding utility levels for A that
make the collusion proof implementation of a monotonic output pro￿le possible are given as
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xe ￿ + ￿,
(15)
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x￿ ￿ xe ￿
￿o
.
An examination of the coalitional information rent levels in (15) indicate that the collusion
proof outcome, or the class of outcomes (since each monotonic output pro￿le gives a di⁄erent
outcome), above induces an improvement over no-supervision implementation. To see this,
suppose the pro￿le being implemented is the optimal no-supervision output pro￿le fxns
￿ g￿2￿.
Notice that the coalitional information rent levels V￿ and Ve ￿ in (15) are the same as the cor-
responding no-supervision information rent levels V o
￿ (￿) and V o
e ￿ (￿) evaluated for fxns
￿ g￿2￿.
However, V￿, the coalitional rent for the state of the world where A is type ￿, is strictly lower
than its no-supervision counterpart V o
￿ (￿). This is because the optimal no-supervision outcome





and the monotonicity constraint is slack







The proof of Proposition 3, presented in the Appendix, demonstrates that the information
rent levels in (15) are implementable with a monotonic output pro￿le given ￿ is a non-negative






e ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿
x￿ ￿ xe ￿
￿
. For such values of ￿,
P can reduce the coalitional information rent from the no-supervision information rent levels
for type ￿ by
f(e ￿)
f(￿)￿ by raising the reservation utility of type ￿ by ￿. Notice though that
the resulting outcome is not coalitionally e¢ cient: S and A could increase their total utility
by misreporting type ￿ as type e ￿. This misreporting increases S￿ s surplus by ￿ +
f(e ￿)
f(￿)￿ and
decreases A￿ s utility by ￿. If S was certain of A being type ￿, she would be willing to pay a
22bribe of ￿ in order to persuade A to misreport his type as e ￿. The problem for S is that she
cannot di⁄erentiate between types ￿ and e ￿. Therefore, the latter type can always imitate the
former to get the same bribe. When weighted by the corresponding probabilities of these types,
the expected coalitional gain from misreporting type ￿ is cancelled by the bribe that S must
pay A to realize the gain.
The argument above suggests that inducing a higher reservation utility for the type ￿ agent
increases the payo⁄ of the principal. The increase in the reservation utility of type ￿ that P
can sustain is determined by the following two factors. First, as stipulated by her participation
constraint (6), S￿ s share of the information rent cannot fall below zero. Moreover, the agent of




). The value of
￿ stated in Proposition 3 re￿ ects these two upper bounds on A￿ s reservation utility.





and AIR(￿), the incentive compatibility constraint of the relatively
ine¢ cient type and the individual rationality constraint of the e¢ cient type. This is contrary to
what we would expect under uniform reservation utilities. When considering S￿ s maximization,
A￿ s type not only signals his cost parameter, but also his outside option if he refuses S￿ s col-
lusion o⁄er. By increasing type ￿￿ s reservation utility, the principal provides a ￿countervailing
incentive￿for A in the collusion problem.21;22
We can substitute in the coalitional information rent levels in (15) to ￿nd the optimal
21See Lewis and Sappington [21], Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare [22], and Julien [13] for discussions of how
exogenous type speci￿c reservation utilities create countervailing incentives. In our model, as in models of
common agency and renegotiation, the type speci￿c outside options are endogenously created.
22To our knowledge, these countervailing incentives for colluding agents are ￿rst discussed by Caillaud and
Jehiel [3]. An endogenous incentive reversal of the colluding agents is also utilized by Mookherjee and Tsumagari
[27], Pavlov [29], Che and Kim [7], and Celik [5] in the contexts of collusion between productive agents, collusion
between bidders and collusion involving an uninformed insurer.




f (￿)[W (x￿) ￿ ￿x￿ ￿ V￿] (16)
s.t. x￿ ￿ xe ￿ ￿ x￿ and (15).
As long as the monotonicity constraint is slack for the no-supervision problem, the results we
derive regarding the non-monotonic output levels in the Appendix imply that the solution to
this problem is also the globally optimal collusion proof output pro￿le. We state this result
formally with the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Suppose the monotonicity constraint is slack for the no-supervision problem,
i.e. (3) holds and therefore xns
￿ < xns
e ￿ . A solution to problem (16) is the optimal collusion proof
output pro￿le.
4.2 Remarks on the Optimal Collusion Proof Outcome
￿ Comparison with Collusion Free Supervision
The optimal outcome identi￿ed in (15) is an improvement over no-supervision. However, a
comparison with the coalitional information rents in (7) reveals that this outcome falls short of
achieving the same expected payo⁄ as the optimal collusion free outcome. This is in contrast
to a result by Che and Kim [6] discussed in the introduction. Che and Kim [6] show that the
collusion of risk neutral parties imposes no cost to the principal in a large class of circumstances.
Their result allows for the correlation of information held by the colluding parties as long as a
pairwise identi￿ability condition (which they label as PI0) is satis￿ed by the joint distribution
of types. When the supervisor￿ s information is modeled as a partition of the agent￿ s private
information, this condition is violated. Therefore, Che and Kim￿ s [6] result does not apply to
our environment.23
23Che and Kim [6] also show that condition PI
0 is generic when there are more than two colluding parties, but
24￿ Ex-post Participation Constraints for the Supervisor
The outcome de￿ned by Proposition 3 can leave S with a negative surplus whenever A￿ s
type is ￿. Under the interim participation constraints, this is not a hurdle for implementation.
However, if S can walk out of the contract after A￿ s type is revealed or if S is shielded by
a limited liability requirement, then the participation constraint (6) must be replaced by the
stronger ex-post participation constraints V￿ ￿ U￿ ￿ 0 for ￿ equals e ￿ and ￿. Under these
ex-post participation constraints, the information rent levels in (15) are still the lowest rent
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In the de￿nitions of both the grand contract and the side contract we have not allowed for
lotteries, forcing either contract to be deterministic. At the grand contract level this does not
impose a loss for the principal: The principal￿ s direct payo⁄ is concave and the agent￿ s util-
ity is linear in the output levels. Moreover, all players are risk neutral in monetary transfers.
Therefore, stochastic grand contracts are dominated by the deterministic ones from the princi-
pal￿ s perspective.24 However, the possibility of stochastic side contracts increases the available
collusion opportunities and, therefore, shrinks the implementable set of outcomes further.
Stochastic side contracts would allow S and A to agree on randomizing between di⁄erent
messages they send the grand contract. Capturing the possibility of stochastic side contracts
requires amending the de￿nition of the side contract by extending the range of the function
non-generic when there are two. Therefore, their result is not likely to apply to collusion between a supervisor
and an agent under an alternative information structure.
24Strausz [32] presents an example of bene￿cial stochastic contracts when the agent￿ s utility is not linear in
output.
25which determines the messages by S and A:
m : M0
A ! ￿(MS ￿ MA):
By o⁄ering a stochastic side contract, S is able to induce manipulations randomizing between
di⁄erent misreports for a given type of A such that ^ c : ￿ ! ￿￿. Extending the set of
manipulations available for the colluding parties may jeopardize the implementability of the






e ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿
x￿ ￿ xe ￿
￿
, implying




is slack. Even with stochastic side contracts, it is
not possible for the coalition to achieve complete coalitional e¢ ciency by misreporting type
￿ as type e ￿ with probability one. However, S and A can increase the coalitional gain by





is satis￿ed even without increasing the rent left for type e ￿. Therefore S
extracts the entire coalitional gain. Consequently, the outcome in (15) is not implementable. In
contrast, when ￿ =
￿
e ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿











over misreports do not improve S￿ s rent extraction. Any manipulation that assigns a positive
probability to misreporting type ￿ as e ￿ requires leaving a bribe to type e ￿ that would cancel any
bene￿t S may receive from the misreporting. Therefore, if ￿ =
￿
e ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿







then the information rent levels in (15) are collusion proof even when stochastic side contracts
are available.25
￿ Distortions and Social Welfare
25In contrast to the deterministic side contracts, when stochastic side contracts are allowed, improvements
over the no-supervision optimal outcome demand for a non-marginal increase in the reservation utility of the
most e¢ cient type ￿. As long as
￿
e ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿






x￿, the information rent levels in (15) are collusion
proof under the stochastic side contracts for ￿ =
￿
e ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿
x￿ ￿ xe ￿
￿
. However, these information rent levels are
not collusion proof for a smaller value of ￿. This non-marginal increase in the reservation utility is required to





while colluding with the supervisor.
26The relevance result established that P￿ s payo⁄ under collusion proof supervision is strictly
higher than its no-supervision optimal level. Another question of interest is the overall e⁄ect
of supervision on the social welfare. Since utility functions of all three players are quasilinear
in money, the extent of output distortions is a good measure of welfare. Let fx￿
￿g￿2￿ be the







as the pro￿le of ￿￿rst best￿
output levels, where W0(x
fb
￿ ) = ￿: A comparison of fx￿
￿g￿2￿ with the no-supervision optimal
output levels fxns
￿ g￿2￿ is su¢ cient to identify the social welfare e⁄ects of supervision. To
simplify the analysis, we consider parameters for which the monotonicity constraint in problem
(16) is slack.26
We will identify the welfare e⁄ects of supervision under two polar cases. First, consider the













.27 In this case,
an increase in the output level of the least e¢ cient type leads to an increase in the value of
￿. Therefore, as can be seen from the information rent levels in (15), an increase in x￿ is not
as costly for P as it would have been under no-supervision. Accordingly, at the solution of
problem (16), the output level for the least e¢ cient type is distorted less than it would have




￿ ). Since the output levels
for types ￿ and e ￿ would be the same as their no-supervision levels, the optimal collusion proof
outcome creates higher social welfare than does the optimal no-supervision outcome.
We can also construct a case where the welfare implication of supervision is reversed: Sup-
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:
This condition is stronger than condition (3), which ensures that the monotonicity constraint is slack for the
no-supervision problem.
27The upper bound on ￿ satisfying this inequality depends on the function W (￿). However, since lim￿!0 x
￿
￿ =
1, there exists a value for ￿ that satis￿es the inequality.
27pose ￿ is large enough so that ￿ =
￿











￿:28 In this case, the value
of ￿ is increasing in the di⁄erence between the output levels of types ￿ and e ￿. Accordingly, P
￿nds it pro￿table to increase x￿ and reduce xe ￿ from their no-supervision levels (xe ￿ < xns







￿ ). This time, both output levels are distorted further from their ￿rst best
levels relative to their no-supervision levels. Since the output level for type ￿ is the same as
its no-supervision level, we conclude that the optimal supervision outcome creates lower social
welfare than does the optimal no-supervision outcome.29;30
￿ Accuracy of the Supervisory Information
Faure-Grimaud, La⁄ont, and Martimort [9] show that the principal￿ s optimal collusion proof
payo⁄ approaches its no-supervision level when a supervisor￿ s information approaches either
perfect information of A￿ s type or the complete lack of information. Since the information
structure we adopt for the supervisor is between these two extremes by design, we cannot
conduct a similar comparative statics analysis here. However, we show two exercises that
provide some insight into the e⁄ects of the accuracy of S￿ s information. First, consider the
case where the cost levels of the two types that S cannot distinguish tend to each other, i.e.
￿
e ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
! 0. Notice that in the limit, our model converges to a setup with a supervisor who
is perfectly informed of the cost level of the agent. In this case, the expected payo⁄ of the

















= 0, there exists a value for ￿ that satis￿es this inequality.
29The possibility that supervision may decrease social welfare is another di⁄erentiating aspect of the analysis
of this paper. In models of exogenous transaction costs between colluders (surveyed by Tirole [33]), or in models
using asymmetric information to justify the transaction cost approach (such as Faure-Grimaud, La⁄ont, and
Martimort [8,9]), supervision always increases overall e¢ ciency.
30For the intermediate values of ￿, ￿ =
￿














￿, and the social welfare e⁄ect of
supervision is ambiguous.
28tends to zero, the optimal x￿ that solves (16) tends to zero as well. Consequently, ￿ ! 0 and
the expected payo⁄ of the principal approaches its optimal no-supervision level.31
￿ A Model with Finitely Many Cost Levels
Celik [4] extends the analysis to a model where the agent has n possible cost levels and
the supervisor￿ s information is represented as an arbitrary connected partition of these cost
levels. As long as the monotonicity constraints are slack for the no-supervision problem and
the supervisor is partly informed32 on the cost level, collusion proof implementation dominates
no-supervision, which in turn dominates delegation to the supervisor. As in the three cost level
model described here, the connected partition structure and the slackness of the monotonicity
constraints are crucial in identifying that the upward incentive compatibility constraints are
the only relevant constraints to be violated for bene￿cial supervision.
5 Binding Monotonicity Constraint
Suppose the monotonicity constraint is slack for the no-supervision problem. In this case,
our results indicate that the optimal collusion proof outcome induces monotonic output levels.
These output levels constitute a solution to the maximization problem (16). The optimal
collusion proof outcome is strictly better than the no-supervision optimal outcome. However,
the optimal collusion proof outcome is not available to P if he surrenders his control of the
outside option of collusion by delegating to S. In fact all the delegation proof outcomes are
strictly dominated by the no-supervision optimal outcome.
31Notice that as either
￿






tend to zero, inequality (3) can be satis￿ed so that the solution to (16)
gives the optimal collusion proof outcome for either exercise.
32More speci￿cally, we need the supervisor￿ s information structure to contain a partition cell, which excludes
the highest cost level and includes more than one cost level.
29Another question of interest is how these results change if the monotonicity constraint is
binding for the no-supervision problem. We show that non-monotonic output levels are collusion
proof whenever monotonicity is a binding constraint for the no-supervision problem. Moreover,
delegation achieves the lowest coalitional information rent levels implementing a non-monotonic
output pro￿le.
Proposition 5 Suppose the monotonicity constraint is binding for the no-supervision problem,
i.e. (3) does not hold and therefore xns
￿ = xns
e ￿ . Then any non-monotonic output pro￿le such
that xe ￿ < x￿ ￿ x￿ is collusion proof. The lowest coalitional information rent levels and the
corresponding utility levels for A that make the collusion proof implementation of such a non-
monotonic output pro￿le possible are given as
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x￿ ￿ xe ￿
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Moreover, the resulting outcome is delegation proof.
To compare the delegation proof outcome above with the optimal no-supervision outcome,
we utilize functions V o
￿ (￿) de￿ned in (1). These functions yield the no-supervision information
rent levels for the monotonic output pro￿les. However, they are also well de￿ned for non-



















e ￿ (￿) + f (￿)V o
￿ (￿)
evaluated for the same non-monotonic output pro￿le. This leaves P with the same objective
function as in the no-supervision problem (2). Suppose the solution to the no-supervision
problem is non-monotonic when the monotonicity constraint is ignored. Then delegation is an
improvement over no-supervision since P is not constrained by monotonicity under delegation.
As is the case for the optimal collusion proof outcome derived in Proposition 3, the out-




e ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿
x￿ ￿ xe ￿
￿
if they misreported agent type e ￿ as ￿. However, as a result of this
misreport, type e ￿ agent would increase his production level to x￿ from xe ￿. The increased pro-
duction level for this relatively high cost type would require increasing the information rent of
the agent with type ￿. This increase in information rent of type ￿ would cancel out the bene￿t
S would have received from misreporting type e ￿.
Suppose S observes that the type of the agent is either e ￿ or ￿. The relevant constraints
for S￿ s side contract selection problem are the individual rationality constraint of the rela-









. Notice that this pattern of constraints is typical under the uniform reservation
utilities.
Let us compare the coalitional ine¢ ciencies arising under the two collusion proof outcomes
we de￿ned in Propositions 3 and 5. The former outcome, which induces a monotonic output
pro￿le, is depicted by (15). Here, the coalition fails to reduce the output level to xe ￿ for type
￿, even though this would have increased the coalitional rent. The ine¢ ciency in question is
￿overproduction.￿This is contrary to the typical ￿underproduction￿observed in design prob-
lems with uniform reservation utilities, such as the no-supervision problem we discussed as a
benchmark. Sustaining overproduction for the coalition requires the principal￿ s active manipu-
lation of the outside option.
In contrast, the collusion proof outcome depicted by (17) is coalitionally ine¢ cient because
the coalition fails to increase the output level to x￿ for type e ￿. No incentive reversal is required
to generate this underproduction as an equilibrium phenomenon for the supervisor - agent
interaction. Accordingly, there is no need for P to manipulate the outside option for collusion.
For this reason, delegation is a successful tool in the implementation of this outcome.
The discussion above provides an opportunity to revisit a result by Faure-Grimaud, Laf-
font, and Martimort [9], which establishes delegation as the optimal organizational response to
collusion. This result is derived for a model that is characterized by a unit production cost,
31which can assume two possible values (low cost or high cost), and a supervisory signal, which
can also assume two values (low signal or high signal). The realization of the signal is positively
correlated with the realization of the cost. The realized cost is observed by the productive
agent. The realized signal is observed by both the agent and his supervisor. This environment
induces four di⁄erent states of nature, each involving a di⁄erent cost - signal pair.
The optimal collusion proof outcome identi￿ed by Faure-Grimaud, La⁄ont, and Martimort
[9] is an improvement over the optimal no-supervision outcome. In fact, this collusion proof
outcome achieves the same expected payo⁄ as the collusion-free supervision payo⁄ when the
supervisor is risk neutral. The source of this improvement is the principal￿ s ability to implement
di⁄erent output and coalitional rent levels for two states with the same cost level. The output
level for the high cost - low signal state is lower than the high cost - high signal state. Moreover,
when the realized state is high cost - low signal, the supervisor is severely punished for the
mismatch. In this case, it would be a coalitional improvement for the S - A pair to behave as
though the state is high cost - high signal. For this improvement not to materialize, the side
contract must fail to increase the output to its coalitionally e¢ cient level. This underproduction
feature of the required collusion failure is compatible with the performance of the side contract
under delegation.
Before closing this section, we comment on an implication of Proposition 5 on the optimality
of delegation. Suppose the no-supervision monotonicity constraint is binding. Then Proposi-
tion 5 identi￿es the least expensive way of implementing a non-monotonic output pro￿le in a
collusion proof manner. However, it should be noted that the proposition does not imply that
the optimal collusion proof output pro￿le must be non-monotonic. The solution identi￿ed in
(15) with monotonic output levels can yield a higher expected payo⁄ for the principal than any
non-monotonic pro￿le. Whether the optimal non-monotonic pro￿le is superior to the optimal
monotonic pro￿le depends on the speci￿cation of P￿ s direct utility from production W(￿) as well
as the values of the other parameters. Since we do not want to assume any further structure
32on W(￿) we leave this question open.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a justi￿cation for third party supervision even when this third party
can collude with the supervised agent. We model the supervisor￿ s information as a connected
partition of the agent￿ s type space, and we model collusion as a side contract that is o⁄ered by
the supervisor after the grand contract is announced by the principal. The outside option for
this side contract is the non-cooperative play of the game that is induced by the grand contract.
Therefore, the principal can a⁄ect the type dependent opportunity cost of collusion through
his choice of the grand contract. We show that the principal can increase his payo⁄ with the
introduction of the supervisor. Although the supervisor - agent coalition would be better o⁄by
collectively misrepresenting certain states of nature, the principal can rule out such behavior
with the appropriate manipulation of the outside option of collusion.
In our framework, delegation corresponds to a special class of grand contracts which are
not responsive to the agent￿ s reporting. Under delegation, the outside option for collusion is
the shut down of production and, therefore, the principal loses his power to manipulate the
type dependent opportunity cost of collusion. As long as the monotonicity constraint of the
no-supervision implementation problem is slack, delegation performs worse than the absence
of supervision for the principal. Nevertheless, if the no-supervision monotonicity constraint
is binding, then delegation is valuable since it can sustain implementation of non-monotonic
output levels.
337 Appendix
7.1 Implementing Non-monotonic Output Levels
In this part of the Appendix, we study the implementation of non-monotonic output levels
when an informed supervisor is present. Under the no-supervision benchmark, the incentive
constraints of the agent imply that the implementable output levels should be ordered as x￿ ￿
xe ￿ ￿ x￿. When there is a supervisor who can distinguish type ￿ from the other types, the
only monotonicity constraint derived from the agent￿ s incentives is xe ￿ ￿ x￿. This leaves us
with two non-monotonic orderings of output levels which are possibly implementable: xe ￿ ￿
x￿ < x￿ and xe ￿ < x￿ ￿ x￿. With Lemma 1, we show that the former ordering contradicts
the supervisor￿ s surplus maximization. And with Lemma 2, we establish a lower bound on the
expected coalitional information rent level achieving the latter ordering.
Lemma 1 There is no collusion proof outcome inducing output levels such that x￿ < x￿.
Proof. Suppose outcome fx￿;V￿;U￿g￿2￿ is collusion proof and x￿ < x￿. Then it satis￿es
the collusion feasibility conditions stated in (10) and (11). First, take the maximization problem














satis￿ed. For this deviation not to improve the objective function it must be that





Now take the maximization problem in (11). Consider a manipulation where type ￿ is misre-








= Ue ￿;^ c(￿) = ￿; and ^ u(￿) = U￿. Since there is no
change in the utility levels of the agent types, this deviation satis￿es AIR constraints. More-
over, AIC constraints are also satis￿ed since the output level of the e¢ cient type is increased.
For this deviation not to improve the objective function it must be that





34These two inequalities imply x￿ ￿ x￿, which is a contradiction to the supposition that x￿ < x￿.


































where functions V o
￿ (￿) are de￿ned by (1).
Proof. fx￿;V￿;U￿g￿2￿ satis￿es the collusion feasibility conditions stated in (10) and (11).
First, take the maximization problem in (10). Consider a manipulation where type ￿ is misre-








= U￿. Since there is no change in the utility




is satis￿ed. For this deviation not to improve the objective
function it must be that





Now take the maximization problem in (11). Consider a manipulation where type e ￿ is misre-






















are satis￿ed by the construction of ^ u(￿). For this deviation not to improve the objective func-
tion it must be that




































An implication of (23) is
Ue ￿ +
￿
e ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
x￿ ￿ U￿ > 0: (24)
Otherwise, it follows from (23) that xe ￿ ￿ x￿.
35Now consider another manipulation for (11) where types e ￿ and ￿ are misreported as type ￿








= Ue ￿; and ^ u(￿) = Ue ￿ +
￿
e ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
x￿. Since there is pooling of
the two possible types, AIC constraints are trivially satis￿ed. Moreover, constraint AIR(￿)




























































































Participation constraints for the agent (4) and the supervisor (5) imply that V￿ ￿ 0, which
completes the proof of the lemma.
7.2 Proof for Proposition 1
Participation constraints for the agent (4) and the supervisor (5) imply that V￿ ￿ 0. From
delegation feasibility, we also know that fx￿;V￿;U￿g￿2￿ induces a solution to the maximization
problem in (9). Now consider a manipulation where type e ￿ is misreported as type ￿ and the








= Ue ￿ = 0;^ c(￿) = ￿; and
^ u(￿) =
￿
e ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
x￿. This deviation satis￿es d ￿ AIR and AIC constraints. For this deviation
































After rearranging the inequality we get











e ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿
xe ￿ ￿ x￿
￿
: (29)
36Notice that inequality (29) is a stronger condition than the no-supervision IC constraint.
This rules out type e ￿￿ s imitation of type ￿, since the second term on the right hand side
is positive for xe ￿ > x￿. This di⁄erence between the no-supervision and the delegation con-
straints is crucial for establishing our result. A similar constraint to inequality (29) arises in





e ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿
xe ￿ ￿ x￿
￿
can be taxed away from the ￿delegate￿by setting V￿ to be negative
without causing any positive cost of delegation. In contrast, V￿ cannot be a negative number
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: (30)









= Ue ￿ = 0; and ^ u(￿) = U￿ =
￿
e ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
xe ￿. Since there is no change in the utility
levels of the agent types, this deviation satis￿es d ￿ AIR and AIC constraints. For this

















Ve ￿ + f (￿)Ve ￿: (31)
After rearranging the inequality we get
V￿ ￿ Ve ￿ +
￿
e ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
xe ￿: (32)
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7.3 Proof for Proposition 2
Proposition 1 implies that any (strictly) monotonic output pro￿le is delegation proof with
(strictly) higher coalitional information rents than the no-supervision information rents. More-
over, when the no-supervision monotonicity constraint is slack, Lemma 2 implies that there is no
37collusion proof outcome with a non-monotonic output pro￿le undominated by the no-supervision
optimal outcome. The proof follows from the fact that any delegation proof outcome is also
collusion proof.
7.4 Proof for Proposition 3
In the ￿rst part of the proof, we show that the information rent levels identi￿ed in (15) consti-
tute lower bounds on collusion proof information rent levels implementing a monotonic output
pro￿le. In the second part, we show that this information rent pro￿le is indeed collusion proof
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Participation constraints for the agent (4) and the supervisor (5) imply that V￿ ￿ 0. Any
collusion proof outcome fx￿;V￿;U￿g￿2￿ is collusion feasible and therefore, induces a solution









= Ue ￿; and ^ u(￿) = U￿. Since there is no change in the utility levels of
either type, AIR constraints are satis￿ed. Moreover, AIC constraints are satis￿ed since this
manipulation decreases the production level of the ine¢ cient type further. For this deviation
































Now consider another manipulation, where type ￿ is pooled with type e ￿ at production level










e ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
xe ￿; and ^ u(￿) = U￿. Since this is a pooling
contract, AIC constraints are trivially satis￿ed. For this deviation not to improve the objective
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: (36)

























U￿ ￿ Ue ￿
￿
: (37)
We will derive two di⁄erent bounds on the term
￿
U￿ ￿ Ue ￿
￿
on the right hand side of this
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The second bound on U￿ ￿Ue ￿ is a consequence of the participation constraints Ue ￿ ￿ 0 and (6):
U￿ ￿ Ue ￿ ￿ V￿ +
f(e ￿)





































































By dividing both sides of the inequality by [f(e ￿)+f(￿)]










































where ￿ is de￿ned in the proposition. This completes the construction of the lower bound on
the collusion proof information rent levels implementing a monotonic output pro￿le.
39Part 2
The participation constraints are satis￿ed by the outcome identi￿ed in (15). Next, we check
for collusion feasibility. We start by observing that AIC and AIR constraints are satis￿ed
for problems (10) and (11). Note that AIR constraints are tautological and AIC constraints
are satis￿ed since
￿
e ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
x￿ ￿ U￿ ￿ Ue ￿ ￿
￿
e ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
xe ￿. For either (10) or (11) to fail, there
must exist an alternative outcome satisfying the constraints and yielding a higher value of the
objective function. A necessary condition for this is the existence of a type ￿ with a misreport
^ c(￿) that gives a higher coalitional rent:
V^ c(￿) + (^ c(￿) ￿ ￿)x^ c(￿) > V￿: (43)
The only possible coalitional improvement is misreporting type ￿ as another type. The max-
imum value for V^ c(￿) + (^ c(￿) ￿ ￿)x^ c(￿) ￿ V￿ under such a deviation is
f(e ￿)
f(￿)￿ (achieved when
^ c(￿) = e ￿). To implement this increase in the coalitional information rent, S incurs the cost of
adjusting the agent￿ s share of this rent. This share is determined by the AIC and AIR con-










￿ ^ u(￿) ￿
￿
e ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
x^ c(￿) ￿ U￿ ￿
￿
e ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
xe ￿ = ￿: (44)
Since the utility of type e ￿ is 0 prior to deviation, there is a net cost incurred by S of the amount
￿ whenever the type of the agent is e ￿. When weighted by the appropriate probabilities in the
objective function in (11), we see that S￿ s gain whenever A is type ￿ is completely consumed
by her loss whenever A is type e ￿. Therefore, there is no pro￿table deviation for S.
7.5 Proof for Proposition 4
It follows from Proposition 3 that the solution to (16) is optimal within the class of the col-
lusion proof outcomes inducing monotonic output pro￿les. Moreover, when the no-supervision
monotonicity constraint is slack, Lemma 2 implies that there is no collusion proof outcome
40with a non-monotonic output pro￿le superior to the no-supervision optimal outcome, which is
already dominated by the solution to (16).
7.6 Proof for Proposition 5








Ve ￿ + f (￿)V￿ for the outcome










e ￿ (￿) + f (￿)V o
￿ (￿) evaluated for the same non-monotonic
output pro￿le. Recall that this is the lower bound on the expected coalitional information rent
identi￿ed in Lemma 2. To complete the proof, it su¢ ces to show delegation proofness of (17)
for any arbitrary output pro￿le satisfying xe ￿ < x￿ ￿ x￿. Establishing delegation proofness of
(17) follows the same steps as establishing collusion proofness of (15) in the second part of the
proof of Proposition 3.
Outcome (17) satis￿es the participation constraints for both A and S. Next, we check for
delegation feasibility. We start by observing that AIC and d ￿ AIR constraints are satis￿ed for
problems in (8) and (9). For either conditions (8) or (9) to fail, there must exist an alternative
outcome satisfying the constraints and yielding a higher value of the objective function. A
necessary condition for this is the existence of a type ￿ with a misreport ^ c(￿) that gives a
higher coalitional rent:
V^ c(￿) + (^ c(￿) ￿ ￿)x^ c(￿) > V￿: (45)
By construction of the coalitional rent levels in (17), there is no coalitional improvement from
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: This rules out the possibility of a coalitional improvement from misreporting type
￿. The remaining possibility is a coalitional improvement from misreporting type e ￿. The maxi-
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= ￿). To implement this increase in the coalitional information rent, S
incurs the cost of adjusting A￿ s share of this rent. A￿ s share is determined by the d ￿ AIC and
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x^ c(e ￿) ￿
￿
e ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
x￿: (46)
Since the utility of type ￿ is
￿
e ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
xe ￿ prior to the deviation, the net cost of the manipulation
for S whenever the type of the agent is ￿ is
￿
e ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿
x￿ ￿ xe ￿
￿
. When weighted by the appro-
priate probabilities in the objective function in (9), we see that S￿ s gain whenever A is type
e ￿ is completely consumed by her loss whenever A is type ￿. Therefore, there is no pro￿table
manipulation available to S.
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